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SUMMER 1965]
A LANDMARK IN FEDERAL PROCEDURAL REFORM
By ALEXANDER HOLTZOFFt
THE WELCOME and far-reaching decision of the Supreme Court
in Hanna v. Plumer,' handed down on April 26, 1965, has an
importance and significance in the progress of procedural reform far
beyond the precise point decided by it. Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion for a unanimous bench with a concurring opinion
by Mr. Justice Harlan. The case involved a civil action brought in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Federal
jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship between the parties.
The plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries re-
sulting from an automobile accident. The driver, whose negligence
was claimed to have caused the injuries, was deceased, and the suit
was brought against her executor. Service of the summons and com-
plaint was made by leaving copies of the papers at the defendant's
place of abode "with a person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein," in accordance with Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion for summary judgment made
by the defendant was granted by the District Court on the ground
that the law of Massachusetts was applicable, which required service
on an executor or administrator to be made by "delivery in hand."
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the decision of
the District Court.2 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
judgment and held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controlled
service of process even in actions based on diversity of citizenship and
that consequently the state law did not govern.
The wide-spread ramifications and the numerous implications of
this ruling can best be realized and appreciated by setting it in its
proper place in the history of the development of the reformed federal
civil procedure. The present practice was adopted in 1938. It has
become so ingrained in our law that it is already being taken for
granted. The younger members of the bar, as well as the current
t United States District Judge for the District of Columbia.
1. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Because of the vital role that this case is likely to
play in molding Federal civil procedure and because it does not seem to have
attracted the attention that it should receive, an invitation on the part of the Editors
of the VILLANOVA LAW REVIxW to contribute a short discussion of the decision was
accepted by me with pleasure.
2. 331 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964).
(701)
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generation of law students, are often not aware of the state of federal
civil procedure prior to 1938, and of the epoch-making advance made
by the Supreme Court in adopting and promulgating the present
rules.
Mr. Justice Holmes aptly remarked that, "The history of what
the law has been is necessary to the knowledge of what the law is.'3
Prior to the adoption of the present procedure, the federal courts
maintained the historic division between law and equity. There was
a uniform procedure for equity cases, governed by Equity Rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, in actions at
law the district courts were required by the Conformity Act of 1872'
to follow the practice of the state in which the federal court sat, "as
near as may be." The practice varied from state to state. A few
states, as well as the District of Columbia, still clung to common
law pleading with all its casuistries and sophistries, thereby forcing
it on the federal courts sitting in those jurisdictions. In 1934, after
many years of travail on the part of far-sighted leaders of the bench
and bar, the Congress enacted the statute which authorized the Supreme
Court to regulate by general rules the pleading, practice and pro-
cedure of the district courts in civil actions.' The Supreme Court
first resolved to unite law and equity and to abolish the procedural
distinctions between the two. A formal public announcement to that
effect was made by Chief Justice Hughes. The Court then appointed
an eminent Advisory Committee to draft the proposed Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.6 In due course the rules were drafted and
eventually adopted and promulgated by the Supreme Court. The result
was the creation of a uniform, simple civil procedure for all the
federal courts completely disconnected from that prevailing in the states.
It constituted a major achievement and notable landmark in the history
of American jurisprudence. The new procedure was outstanding, not
only because it was uniform throughout the federal judicial system, but
also because it was simple and expeditious. It eliminated technicali-
ties and provided broad and liberal discovery, thereby facilitating
decision of cases on their merits. The advantages of the reformed
federal procedure are vividly demonstrated by the fact that it has been
gradually adopted by many of the states.
3. HOLMes, Tut COMMON LAW 37 (1881).
4. Riv. STAT. § 914 (1875).
5. Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U.S.C. 2072 (1958).
6. Former Attorney General William D. Mitchell was the Chairman, the late
Judge Charles E. Clark was the Reporter and Edgar Tolman the Secretary of the
Committee.
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Almost simultaneously with the adoption of the Rules, the Supreme
Court decided the case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,7 which held
that there was no federal common law and that in civil actions in which
federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, the applicable
substantive law of the state should determine the rights of the
parties. The result was that in all civil actions, procedure in the federal
courts was governed by uniform federal rules and was the same
throughout the federal judicial system, while questions of substantive
law in actions founded on diversity of citizenship were determined by
state law and, therefore, might vary from state to state. The dis-
position of substantive rights was to be the same in both federal and
state courts. It has been said at times that the end to be achieved was
that the outcome of a law suit should be the same irrespective of whether
it bebrought in a federal or state court. This generalization is not
entirely accurate. It is correct as to rulings on questions of sub-
stantive law. On the other hand, it is possible for differences of
procedure occasionally to lead to different results of the litigation.
For example, liberal discovery permitted by federal procedure may
enable a party to prove his claim or to establish his defense, which
he may be unable to do in a state where the scope of discovery is
more limited.
While the basic principles, at first blush, seem simple, doubts at
times began to arise as to what constituted procedure and what was
comprehended in substantive law. There is a twilight zone. Gradually
by the traditional case-by-case method, the penumbra was contracted
and the area of uncertainty was diminished. The Hanna case takes an
important step in this direction.
One of the early decisions in this field was Sampson v. Channell,8
determined by the First Circuit. In that case there was presented
the question whether the burden of proof on the issue of contributory
negligence in an action to recover damages for negligence, was to be
governed by state law or by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which by Rule 8(c) required contributory negligence to be pleaded
as an affirmative defense. In some states the local law imposes on the
plaintiff the onus of establishing freedom from contributory negligence.
Such proof is considered an element of the cause of action. In other
jurisdictions contributory negligence is regarded as an affirmative de-
fense and, therefore, the burden of proving it is cast on the defendant.
In an elaborate and well considered opinion by Judge Magruder, the
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. 110 F.2d 754 (lst Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
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court held that the burden of proof as to contributory negligence
should be classified as a matter of substantive law rather than pro-
cedure. The court pointed out that the incidence of burden of proof
in such an instance may determine the outcome of the case, and that
the situation seemed to call for the application of the rule of the
Erie Railroad case. The opinion also dealt with another topic,
namely, whether the law of the forum or the law of the state where
the cause of action arose, was applicable, but this subject is outside
of the scope of the present discussion.
Later the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Hoffman,' approved the
ruling of the Sampson case, stating that, "The question of the burden
of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law which
federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases must apply." In an
analogous decision, Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap,'0 the Supreme
Court held that the burden of proof on an issue of bona fide purchase
without notice was not within the category of practice and procedure but
was a question of substantive right. The Court observed that the
matter involved a valuable assurance in connection with titles to
property. The conclusion was reached that under the doctrine of the
Erie Railroad case, the subject was governed by state law and not
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Decisions thus far reviewed constitute important steps in the
direction of clarifying the distinction between substantive rights on the
one hand, and practice and procedure on the other, and the relation
of the doctrine of the Erie Railroad case to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Any matter that was involved in the cause of action
itself or in a defense to it, was to be regarded as substantive and
therefore governed by local law. The result did not encroach or
infringe in any respect upon the predominance of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in all procedural matters.
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.," the Supreme Court had occasion
to delineate and define the scope of the rule-making power as con-
cerned federal civil procedure. Apparently for the first time the validity
of one of the federal rules was attacked. Rule 35 providing for physical
examinations was assailed as being outside of the orbit of the authority
conferred on the Supreme Court by Congress to regulate pleading,
practice and procedure in the district courts. It was argued that the
rule abridged substantive rights. This contention was overruled and
the validity of the rule was sustained. The Court stated that the test
9. 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943), rehearing denied, 318 U.S. 800 (1943).
10. 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939).
11. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
704
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whether a matter was one of procedure or substantive law ". . . must
be whether a rule really regulates procedure, - the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and
for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction
of them."'"
In this decision the Supreme Court helped to clarify the dis-
tinction between procedure and substantive law by protecting its power
over the former and at the same time drawing a definite boundary line
between the two. Its significance is silhouetted graphically by the
dissenting opinion, which urged that the rule-making power did not
extend to drastic changes in public policy as to vital matters, such as
those affecting privacy. In answer to this argument the majority
opinion emphasized the fact that the rule-making power comprehended
important and substantial rights as well as those of lesser importance,
as long as they were in the field of procedure. The fact that a rule
might result in a major change of policy was held not to preclude the
Supreme Court from adopting it.
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,'" the Supreme Court held that the
applicability of statutes of limitations was to be regarded as sub-
stantive rather than as procedural for the purpose here discussed, and,
therefore, was to be governed by state law. While in some connections
statutes of limitations have been deemed to be part of adjective law
as being directed to the remedy rather than to the right, they actually
determine the right to maintain an action because of the lapse of time
and, therefore, for the purposes here involved are properly classified
to be within the realm of substantive law.
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-op.,14 the Supreme
Court held that in respect to distribution of functions between judge
and jury, the federal courts were not bound by state law, but were
required to follow uniform federal practice. While this case did
not deal with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure vis-a-vis the
doctrine of the Erie Railroad case, it has a significance in the present
discussion in that it demonstrates the wholesome desire of the Supreme
Court to sustain control of uniform procedure in the federal judicial
system, and to vindicate its complete independence of state practice.
At this point it is necessary to refer to two decisions of the
Supreme Court which seemed to deviate from the line of cases just
considered. In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 5
12. Id. at 14.
13. 326 U.S. 99 (1945), rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 806 (1945).
14. 356 U.S. 525 (1958), rehearing denied, 357 U.S. 933 (1958).
15. 337 U.S. 530 (1949), rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 839 (1949).
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a tort action was brought in the federal court in Kansas, jurisdiction
being based on diversity of citizenship. In accordance with the federal
rules the suit was instituted by filing a complaint with the court and
a summons was issued by the clerk. Service was had almost four
months later. Kansas had a two-year statute of limitations applicable
to tort claims. The statute had run between the filing of the suit and
service of the summons and complaint. It was claimed by the plaintiff,
however, that the filing of the complaint constituted the commencement
of the action under the federal rules and that, therefore, the suit was
not barred. A Kansas statute, however, provided that an action should
be deemed to have been commenced on the date of the service of the
summons. The Supreme Court held that the Kansas statute was
applicable under the Erie doctrine, and that the federal rule as to the
manner of commencement of the action was not determinative.
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,6 the Supreme
Court ruled that a state enactment requiring the plaintiff in a stock-
holder's derivative suit, where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity
of citizenship, to post security for reasonable expenses of the defense
as a condition of maintaining the action, is applicable in the federal
court. In both the Ragan and the Cohen cases, the Supreme Court
held that the state statute was not a mere procedural device but
affected substantive rights. In each instance there were dissenting
opinions.
It would seem that these two decisions created some uncertainty as
to the boundaries of the twilight zone between procedure and sub-
stantive law in the field which we are discussing. They emphasize
the importance of the recent decision in Hanna v. Plummer.7 As has
already been stated, Hanna v. Plummer held that service of process in
actions in federal courts, even where jurisdiction is predicated on
diversity of citizenship, is to be governed by the federal rules and not
by local statutes which may prescribe a different manner of service.
It would seem to follow as a corollary that the federal rules would
be equally applicable to the manner of commencing an action in the
federal courts and that, therefore, the Ragan case may be deemed to
have been overruled. Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion
in the Hanna case expressly stated: "I think that the decision [i.e. in
the Ragan case] was wrong."'" Whether in the light of the compre-
hensive discussion in the opinion of Chief Justice Warren in the
Hanna case, the same solution should be reached in the problem in-
16. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
17. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
18. Id. at 477.
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 4 [1965], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol10/iss4/11
SUMMER 1965] FEDERAL PROCEDURAL REFORM
volved in the Cohen case, is no doubt a matter for future consideration
if occasion arises.
The vital importance of the Hanna case and its felicitous augury
for the future is that it ascribes an overriding force to the federal rules.
They are to prevail as against any conflicting state statute or decision,
even though the state law is based on considerations of public policy
which differ from those reflected in the federal rules. The decision
is a clear vindication of the potency and enduring permanence of the
great reform in federal procedure that came into being in 1938. In
the course of his opinion, the Chief Justice made .the significant
observation that "The Erie rule has never been invoked to void
a Federal Rule."'" He also remarked:
...the constitutional provision for a federal court system (aug-
mented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it
congressional power to make rules governing the practice and
pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to
regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area
between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classi-
fication as either.20
Again, he stated:
Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized
power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal
courts even though some of those rules will inevitably differ from
comparable state rules.2
Thus the Supreme Court has concluded that federal rules governing
pleading, practice and procedure in the United States district courts
are paramount, even within the area in which matters are rationally
capable of being classified as either substantive or procedural, and
even if the federal rules differ from state law on the same subject.
The vigor and the broad scope of the federal rules are clearly established
by the Hanna case.
19. Id. at 470.
20. Id. at 472.
21. Id. at 473.
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